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CURRENT CASES
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS A
"LITERAL INTERPRETATION" APPROACH TO THE
"WORK FOR HIRE" DOCTRINE. Dumas v. Gommerman,
865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
On January 13, 1989, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rede-
fined the "work for hire" doctrine. In adopting a "literal interpreta-
tion" approach to interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 101,1 the court rejected
prior formulations by the Second and Seventh Circuits2 and ruled
that "only works produced by formal, salaried employees are cov-
ered by 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)." 3 Further, the court announced that
"[w]orks by independent contractors are works for hire only when
the requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) are satisfied." 4 This narrow
interpretation of the "work for hire" doctrine draws a bright line
distinction between employees and independent contractors. As a
result, copyright ownership disputes between employers and em-
ployees and/or independent contractors need no longer involve am-
biguous questions of "supervision and control" as required by the
formulations employed by the Second and Seventh Circuits.'
The implications of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation are
profound. First, companies utilizing independent contractors must
1. Hereinafter all code section references will be to the 1976 Copyright Act, located at
Title 17 of the United States Code.
2. The leading case in the Second Circuit is Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). This case was quoted and
followed by the Seventh Circuit in Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d
889 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). See infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
3. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). A "work made for
hire" is defined by § 101 as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or
(2) a work specifically ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire.
4. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105. See supra note 3.
5. Id. See infira note 24 and accompanying text.
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reevaluate their contractual position with respect to any copyright-
able material resulting from such relationships. Second, a genuine
conflict now exists among the courts of appeal. While the approach
taken by the Ninth Circuit seems to lead to more predictable and
consistent results, only an appeal to the Supreme Court is likely to
resolve the conflict.6
Dumas v. Gommerman arose out of a dispute over the owner-
ship of the copyrights to four works of art. In 1979, ITT Canon
retained the advertising agency of D'Arcy, MacManus & Masius,
Inc. (D'Arcy) to create four paintings. Canon planned to use these
paintings to produce sets of lithographs to give to its distributors as
part of a promotional campaign. D'Arcy then commissioned Pat-
rick Nagel, a graphic artist and commercial illustrator, to create the
four paintings. D'Arcy provided Nagel with sketches which he
then used to prepare his illustrations. ITT Canon accepted and
paid for Nagel's paintings and, from them, created the lithographs
to use in its campaign. The campaign was less than successful and
the four original paintings were subsequently destroyed, but some of
the lithographs remained in ITT Canon's possession.
Nagel died in 1984. His widow, Jennifer Dumas, the plaintiff
in this action, became the successor in interest to any copyrights he
held in his works.7 In 1985, ITT Canon sold the remaining litho-
graphs, along with any existing copyrights, to the defendant, Stefan
Gommerman. Gommerman registered his copyrights in January
1986.
Dumas learned of the purported copyright transfer in January
1986 and immediately notified Gommerman and ITT Canon of her
claim of copyright ownership. Gommerman disregarded her notice
and proceeded to reproduce posters from one of the lithographs.
On May 8, 1987, Dumas filed a conflicting registration of copy-
6. The conflict may be resolved this term. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988). In this case, the D.C. Circuit held that a non-profit organiza-
tion which conceived of the idea for a Nativity scene and hired a sculptor to render three
figures and a shopping cart was not the "author" of the sculpture under the "work for hire"
doctrine. The court reasoned that the sculptor was an independent contractor, based on the
rules of agency law. This case brought the D.C. Circuit in line with the Fifth Circuit, which
first applied the "literal interpretation" approach in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children
v. Playboy Enterprises Inc., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987) cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
The opposing view is represented by Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d
548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984), Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems
Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 949 (1986), and Brunswick
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987).
7. As with most artists, the value of Nagel's artwork increased dramatically after his
death.
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right. On June 22, 1987, she filed a complaint against Gommerman
for damages and declaratory relief for copyright infringement and
for unauthorized use of a deceased personality's name in violation
of California Civil Code § 990. On June 23, 1987, she moved for a
preliminary injunction to prevent Gommerman from manufactur-
ing, distributing, or copying the lithographs. The district court
granted the injunction.'
The sole issue Gommerman raised on appeal was whether the
district court applied the correct legal standard in determining
whether Nagel was an employee producing "works for hire" under
§ 101. The district court relied on the "supervision and control"
test to determine that Nagel was not an "employee" for purposes of
the Copyright Act.9 The court of appeals affirmed the holding of
the district court, but based it opinion on the "literal interpretation"
test. Judge Fletcher employed a traditional three-pronged approach
to support this analysis. First, she reviewed the history of the
"work for hire" doctrine. Second, she analyzed the legislative his-
tory and statutory context of §§ 101, 102, and 201. Finally, she
scrutinized the holdings of sister jurisdictions and found that they
had misinterpreted congressional intent regarding the "work for
hire" doctrine.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, judicial application of the
statutory "work for hire" doctrine created a strong presumption in
favor of the employer. Unless the parties agreed otherwise, anyone
who paid an artist to create a copyrightable work was the statutory
author and, hence, the owner of the copyright. 10 Such a test unduly
protected the employer's entrepreneurial idea at the expense of the
artist's creative labor.Il This employer-oriented approach has been
abandoned under the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter the
"Act"). The presumption under the 1909 Act has been replaced by
8. The injunction specified that "neither Gommerman nor his business, nor his busi-
ness entities, nor his agents may (1) reproduce or otherwise manufacture the ITT works; or
(2) sell, advertise, or in any way distribute reproductions of the ITT works already in the
possession of the defendants." Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1095.
9. Gommerman agreed with the "supervision and control" test, but maintained that
the district court was too strict in requiring proof of significant control. He argued that any
identifiable measure of direction and control should be sufficient. Dumas also agreed with the
district court's choice of test, but suggested that the narrower "literal interpretation" test
developed in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises Inc., 815 F.2d
323 (5th Cir. 1987) should be applied. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1096.
10. 'This has been called the 'instance [sometimes "insistence"] and expense' test, after
Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966).
In other words, only when an artist sold a pre-existing work would she be likely to retain the
copyright under work for hire law." Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1096 n.5.
11. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1096 n. 5.
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a definitional framework which clearly delineates the rights of the
respective parties. 12
Section 201(a) establishes the initial ownership of a copyright:
"Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author or authors of the work."
Section 201(b) establishes authorship of works made for hire:
"[T]he employer or other person for whom the work was prepared
is considered the author... and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright."
Section 101 defines "works made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contri-
bution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties ex-
pressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire. (Emphasis
added.)
The interaction of these three statutes allocates copyright own-
ership interests in the following manner:
Works Prepared Works Prepared by
by Employees Independent Contractors
§ 101(1) § 101(2)
No Explicit Copyright ownership Copyright ownership
Agreement automatically vests in automatically vests in
employer, independent contractor.
Work for Hire Unnecessary. Copyright ownership
Contract depends on the terms of
the contract.
Having established the statutory framework, two divergent
12. Obviously, not all of the circuits agree that this was the intent of Congress. Accord-
ing to the Second Circuit:
Under the 1909 Act and decisions construing it, if an employer supervised and
directed the work, an employer-employee relationship could be found even
though the employee was not a regular or formal employee... [citations omit-
ted] ... Nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended to dispense with this prior law applying the concepts of
"employee" and "scope of employment."
Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
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analyses ensue. The key terms "employee," "employer," and
"scope of employment" are not defined in the Act. The Second and
Seventh Circuits resort to the "supervision and control" test to
distinguish employees from independent contractors. These circuits
hold that "the definitions in § 101 require the court to determine
whether an artist, hired to produce a specific work, was in fact
'independent' or was 'so controlled and supervised in the creation of
the particular work by the employing party that an employer-
employee relationship exists,'" in which case § 101(1) applies. 3
The Ninth Circuit, relying on the statutory context and
legislative history of the "work for hire" provisions, considered and
rejected this approach. Instead, the court found that the term
"employee" means, quite simply, a formal, salaried employee.' 4 To
support this interpretation, the court found that the Act constitutes
an interlocking framework of statutes designed to balance the
competing interests of creators and marketers of copyrightable
material.
The interests of creators, i.e. independent contractors, are
protected by § 101(2), which prevents their works from being
designated as "made for hire" without their consent.
Sections 101(1) and 201(b) combine to protect the interests of
employers. First, § 101(1) provides that the works of "employees,"
i.e. formal, salaried employees, are works made for hire. Second,
§ 201(b) establishes the employer as the initial author of works
made for hire. Therefore, the employer is the author of all works
created by its employees. This imputed authorship has two further
effects. First, it grants ownership of any copyrights to the
employer. Notwithstanding § 201(b), copyright ownership would
13. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102, citing Aldon, 738 F.2d 548, 552.
14. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105. When it is unclear whether the parties have a formal,
salaried employer-employee relationship, relevant factors may include:
(1) whether the artist worked in his or her own studio or on the premises of
the buyer;
(2) whether the buyer is in the regular business of creating works of the type
purchased;
(3) whether the artist works for several buyers at a time, or exclusively for one;
(4) whether the buyer retains authority to assign additional projects to the
artist;
(5) the tax treatment of the relationship by the parties;
(6) whether the artist is hired through the channels the buyer customarily uses
for hiring new employees;
(7) whether the artist is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and
(8) whether the artist obtains from the buyer all benefits customarily extended
to its regular employees.
1989]
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vest in the employee, rather than the employer, at the moment the
work becomes fixed in a tangible medium of expression because
copyright protection subsists from the moment of fixation,' 5 and a
transfer of copyright ownership would otherwise require a written
instrument signed by the employee. 6 Second, § 201(b) eliminates
§ 203(a) termination rights. 7 If the copyright were owned by the
employee and were transferred to the employer, § 203(a) would
permit the employee to terminate the transfer. Instead, § 201(b)
vests "all of the rights comprised in the copyright" in the employer,
thereby eliminating the need for any type of transfer from the
employee to the employer. Thus, by clearly defining the respective
rights of employers, employees, and independent contractors, the
Act balances and protects the interests of all parties.
The Ninth Circuit also found support for its interpretation in
the legislative history of the "work for hire" doctrine. The House
of Representatives recognized the need to distinguish works made
for hire from works made during the regular course of employment:
The status of works prepared on special order or commission was
a major issue in the development of the definition of "works
made for hire" in section 101, which has undergone extensive
revision during the legislative process. The basic problem is how
to draw a statutory line between those works written on special
order or commission that should be considered as "works made
for hire," and those that should not. The definition now pro-
vided by the bill represents a compromise which, in effect, spells
out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be
considered "works made for hire" under certain circumstances.' 8
The reference to "compromise" in the House Report refers to
more than twenty years of negotiations between creators and mar-
keters of copyrighted material. "[T]he substantive content of the
statute emerged as a series of interrelated and dependent com-
promises among industries with differing interests in copyright."' 9
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
16. Id. at § 204(a).
17. Section 203(a) provides: "In the case of any work other than a work made for hire,
the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under
a copyright... is subject to termination ...." (Emphasis added.)
18. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
19. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1099, quoting from Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legis.
lative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 862 (1987). After quoting Litman, the court pro-
ceeded to discuss four proposals which were considered in reaching the consensus found in
the Act. Only the fourth, the 1965 Revision Bill, H.R. 4347, see infra, note 21, is discussed in
this casenote.
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The Register of Copyrights stated that "the definition of works
made for hire now in section 101 represents a carefully worked out
compromise aimed at balancing legitimate interests on both
sides.. .[E]xcept for the enumerated categories, other works made
on special order or commission would not come within the defini-
tion."20 The 1965 Revision Bill"' reflects the dichotomy between
employees and independent contractors that survived into the
Copyright Act of 1976:
The content of the pre-legislative dialogue and the context in
which it occurred indicated that by using the term 'employee' the
parties meant to limit works made for hire under this branch of
the definition to works created by a salaried worker in a long-
term position.... Commissioned works, on the other hand, were
to be treated as works for hire only if they fell within specific
enumerated categories, and even then only if there was an agree-
ment in writing that the work was a work for hire.22 (Emphasis
in original).
The social policy behind the "work for hire" doctrine lends
further support to the court's interpretation.
A commission to produce a work of art is essentially just
another contract. By designating some works as works for hire
the statute functions, in the case of initial ownership of copy-
right, as a default mode, applying where the parties did not ex-
press their intentions in writing. Imposing the burden to
contract to avoid the statutory rule on the purchaser [employer],
who generally has the stronger bargaining position and readier
access to legal advice, is the intended balance .... We need not
assume that artists are always in an unequal bargaining position
owing to their legendary habits of imprudence in business affairs,
but they are nevertheless disadvantaged by the impossibility of
determining their work's full value until it has been exploited. 3
Thus, the statutory framework of the Act, its legislative his-
tory, and social policy all support a narrow, literal interpretation of
the statutory term, "employee." Despite this clear mandate, the
Second and Seventh Circuits have resurrected the approach used
20. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1100 quoting from Copyright Law Revision Part 6: Supplemen-
tary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright
Law, 66-67 (Comm. Print 1965).
21. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
22. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1101, partially quoting from Litman, supra note 19, at 890.
23. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1101. See Varmer, Works Made for Hire and on Commission,
Study No. 13 for the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights 140, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law revision (Comm. Print 1961). See also H.L REP No. 1476,
supra note 18 at 124.
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prior to enactment of the 1976 Act. The Fifth and D.C. Circuits
recognize the need to narrowly define "employee," but err in adopt-
ing an approach which indirectly relies on the rejected "supervision
and control" test.
The leading case espousing the "supervision and control" test
is Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. ,24 which affirmed a jury
instruction which stated that the artist need not have a regular job
with the hiring author, so long as the employer caused the work to
be made and exercised the right to direct and supervise the crea-
tion. 5 While this court recognized that the legislative history of the
Act indicated that "Congress intended to change prior work for
hire law dealing with 'works prepared on special order or commis-
sion,'" it distinguished works prepared by contractors who were
supervised and directed by the hiring party.26 These workers, the
court found, would be considered "employees" acting within the
"the scope of employment."27
The Ninth Circuit is strongly critical of this interpretation. It
finds that the "analysis simply fails to acknowledge the changes
wrought by the 1976 Act on the work for hire doctrine . .. 2
Moreover, "[t]heAldon test distorts the balance reached in the 1965
compromise by protecting only a very limited class of independent
contractors from the old law's injustice: 'those situations where the
contractor did all of the creative work and the hiring party did little
or nothing.' ",29 Finally, Aldon's "supervision and control" test un-
dercuts Congressional intent to "increase certainty over whether a
work is made for hire.""0
The Ninth Circuit also distinguishes the approach adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises.3 The
24. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); accord, Evans
Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 949 (1986); see also Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 805
F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1986); Hays v. Sony Corp. of America,
847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
25. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551.
26. Id. at 552.
27. Id. This interpretation creates three categories of independent contractors: those
who are deemed "employees" because of the purchasing party's supervision and control;
those whose commissioned works are works for hire because they fall into the categories of
§ 101(2); and those whose products are not works for hire. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102.
28. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102.
29. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1103, citing Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
30. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1103. See Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for
Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1281,
1298, 1304-05.
31. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 28 (1988). Easter Seal was
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court in Easter Seal was the first to develop and apply the "literal
interpretation" approach. Although the court recognized that the
Act requires a clear distinction between employees and independent
contractors, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statutory term "em-
ployee" according to the common law of agency.32 Under this ap-
proach, works are made for hire only if agency law principles would
find the artist to be an employee of the purchaser, or if the parties
have a written agreement and the works fall within one of the enu-
merated "works for hire" categories in § 101(2).3 The problem
with this approach, according to the Ninth Circuit, is that it indi-
rectly includes the rejected "supervision and control" test. The Re-
statement (Second) of Agency, § 220(2) states: "In determining
whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent con-
tractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work.. ."I Thus, rather than draw-
ing a distinct line between employees and independent contractors,
this approach would require case-by-case analysis, thereby defeating
the Act's twin goals of consistency and predictability.35
Applying the two competing theories to the facts of Dumas is
illustrative. ITT Canon commissioned four paintings, three of
which were to be on pre-determined subjects, the fourth on a sub-
ject of Nagel's own choosing. Under Aldon and Easter Seal the first
three might be works for hire depending on the level of supervision
and control exercised by ITT. The fourth painting, however, would
not be a work for hire because ITT lacked the requisite supervision
followed by the D.C. Circuit in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d
1485, 1494 (1988).
32. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104, n.16. The Fifth Circuit reasons that the phrase "scope of
employment" in § 101(l). is a term of art in agency law, and therefore its use suggests con-
gressional intent to incorporate the agency doctrine. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 335.
33. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
35. If the Fifth Circuit's approach is followed,
a work-by-work analysis may be required to determine ownership disputes, and
some independent contractors could be deemed "employees" where the pur-
chaser includes provisions in the contract granting it substantial rights of con-
trol. This was not intended by the drafters. Because the work for hire doctrine
as finally agreed upon in the compromise effects an implicit transfer of copy-
right ownership while simultaneously destroying the artist's right to terminate
the transfer, the drafters wanted a bright line between employees and in-
dependent contractors, so that the parties would not be mistaken in their ap-
praisal of the contracted work's status, and purchasers would have little ability
to change the artist's presumed status without the artist being fully aware of
the change.
Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104. See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d 323.
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and control. This incongruous result demonstrates the speciousness
of the "supervision and control" test-ITT Canon paid for the same
price for all four paintings!3" Conversely, the "literal interpreta-
tion" approach will lead to consistent, predictable results in every
instance. The only issue will be whether the artist is a "formal,
salaried employee."37 If so, then § 101(1) applies and any resulting
works are works for hire. If not, i.e. where the artist holds himself
out as a freelancer, then the employer should anticipate that the
commissioned work will not be a work for hire unless § 101(2)
applies.
Dumas v. Gommerman was a case of first impression in the
Ninth Circuit. Unrestrained by stare decisis, the court squarely re-
jected sister court interpretations of the "work for hire" provisions
of the 1976 Copyright Act. Depending on the outcome of Creative
Community for Non-Violence3" in the Supreme Court, Dumas
promises to be the seminal proponent of a literal interpretation of
the "work for hire" doctrine. Dumas teaches that the definitions of
"work made for hire" in § 101 are to be read quite literally. All
formal, salaried employees fall into § 101(1). All independent con-
tractors fall into § 101(2); their works will be "made for hire" only
if the parties so agree. These bright line rules will lend consistency
and predictability to the relationships between employers, employ-
36. Id at 1103. Clearly, a reasonable person, even a reasonable artist, would place
some value on the copyright to his or her work.
37. See supra note 14 for a series of tests to determine whether an employer-employee
relationship exists.
38. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988). The court in
CCNV held that:
a copyrightable work of an independent contractor cannot be a work made for
hire under the current Act unless the work falls within one of the specific cate-
gories enumerated in § 101(2) and "the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire." 17 U.S.C § 101(2).
CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1494.
The D.C. Circuit expressly followed the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Easter Seal, 815 F.2d
323. The D.C. Circuit quoted and applied the following analysis from Easter Seal:
[A] court should first determine-using agency law rules-whether or not the
seller is an employee or an independent contractor. Then, the court should
apply the statute. Section 101(1) applies to sellers who are employees. If the
work was in the scope of employment, an agency-law employee is a copyright
employee, and the employer is the "author." Section 101(2) applies to in-
dependent contractors....
CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1492, quoting Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 329.
The "literal interpretation" approach is clearly the better-reasoned analysis. The key
issue before the Supreme Court, then, is to determine the correct standard to distinguish
employees from independent contractors: the Ninth Circuit's "formal, salaried employee"
standard, or the Fifth Circuit's "agency law" standard.
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ees, and independent contractors, thereby achieving the purpose of
the "work for hire" doctrine.
Joe E. Brock

A PROMISE OF CONFORMITY IN THE AREA OF "LOOK
AND FEEL"?; Data East U.S.A., Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d.
204 (9th Cir. 1988).
Case law in the area of "look and feel" has been plagued by
non-conformity as judges are irresolute in their consideration of
what aspects of computer expression are protected by the U.S.
Copyright laws. The discrepancies in court decisions have left pro-
grammers, companies and attorneys with few concrete guidelines as
to what constitutes infringement of intellectual property rights in
audio-visual works. However, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in
Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. suggests that one court may have
settled upon a method of analysis, which although not yet free from
uncertainty, may produce consistent holdings and begin to dispel
the confusion created by prior rulings.
In Data East, the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling of the dis-
trict court and concluded that no copyright infringement occurred.
Justice Trott, writing the opinion for the Ninth Circuit, declined to
address the issue of whether the defendant had access to the pro-
gram underlying the plaintiff's video game after concluding that the
two video games lacked substantial similarity. The finding that no
substantial similarity existed was based on the premise that the idea
behind the video game and the expression of the game were insepa-
rable. Because copyright protection is only afforded to expression
which extends beyond the idea of the video game, no copyright in-
fringement occurred.1 This holding reduces the amount of copy-
right protection available to authors and programmers of video
games; only the original portrayal of an idea will be protected, and
not the general presentation of that idea. However, by adopting an
expanded version of the standard test applied to copyright infringe-
ment cases, the court demonstrates the direction it intends to take
in adjudicating audio-visual cases, and thus provides guidance to
the lower courts.
In 1984, Data East USA, Inc., a California corporation in-
volved in the design, manufacture and sale of arcade video games
and home-computer video games, began distributing an arcade
1. See 3 M. Nimmer, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, § 13.03(a), 1987 ("Copyright does
not protect against the borrowing of abstract ideas contained in the copyrighted
work .... [1]f the only similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's works is that of the
abstract idea, there is an absence of substantial similarity and hence no infringement
results.").
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game entitled "Karate Champ" in Japan, the United States, and
Europe. In October of 1985, Data East developed and began mar-
keting a home-computer version of "Karate Champ" adapted from
its arcade game. The game could be operated on either the Apple
or the Commodore computer. Data East owned the audio-visual
copyright to the home-computer game "Karate Champ" as well as
the trademark "Karate Champ."
In November, 1985, an English company, System III Software,
Ltd., began distributing a home-computer game throughout Eng-
land and other areas of Europe entitled "International Karate."
The conflict arose after defendant, Epyx, Inc., a California corpora-
tion engaged in the development and distribution of home-com-
puter games, learned of System III Software's desire to market the
game in the United States. Epyx and System III Software executed
a licensing and publishing agreement, and in April of 1986, Epyx
began marketing and distributing System III Software's home-com-
puter combat game in the United States under the name "World
Karate Championship." "World Karate Championship" is similar
to the home-computer game marketed by plaintiff, Data East, and is
also compatible with the Apple and Commodore computer systems.
The two home-video games are virtually identical in their de-
piction of a karate match between opponents. Each game presents
two combatants, one in red uniform, the other in white, presided
over by a referee who directs the beginning and end of each phase of
combat and announces the winner by means of an overhead speech
balloon. Each successive round of combat is conducted against a
still background image portraying different geographic locales or
sites. The geographic scene is viewed on the upper portion of the
computer screen, while the combatants and referee are viewed on
the lower half of the screen. Both games utilize a joy stick and a
button to effect the moves of the combatants and include bonus
rounds in which each combatant must dodge flying objects or per-
form other karate feats such as breaking bricks. A similar method
of scoring points is also employed by both games.'
2. The court listed fifteen features of the plaintiff's and defendant's games which it
found to be identical in each game: 1) fourteen moves; 2) a two-player option; 3) a one-player
option; 4) forward and backward somersault moves and about-face moves; 5) a squatting
reverse punch wherein the heel is not on the ground; 6) an upper-lunge punch; 7) a back-foot
sweep; 8) a jumping sidekick; 9) a low kick; 10) a walk-backwards position; 11) changing
background scenes; 12) 30-second countdowns; 13) use of one referee; 14) the referee says
"begin," "stop," "white," "red," which is depicted by a cartoon-style speech balloon; and
15) a provision for 100 bonus points per remaining second. Data East U.S.A., Inc. v. Epyx,
Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Data East brought an action against Epyx in district court on
October 18, 1986, alleging infringement of copyright, trademark
and trade dress, and requesting injunctive relief and impoundment
of the infringing works. With respect to the copyright infringement
claim the court relied on circumstantial evidence to conclude that
defendant had access to plaintiff's underlying program, and also de-
termined that the evidence revealed substantial similarity between
Data East's and System III Software's3 work. Thus, the district
court ruled that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's
copyright.
In the district court, no evidence was produced to show in-
dependent creation by System III Software. This type of evidence
would have negated a finding of access to the underlying program.
Direct evidence did establish that the System III Software program-
mer utilized a more sophisticated programming technique than was
used by Data East. However, the court concluded that because of
the wide dissemination of the arcade version of "Karate Champ,"
and the ease with which a developer could purchase a game and
discover the underlying program, access by System III Software to
Data East's program would be presumed.
In looking at substantial similarity, the district court placed
great weight on the determination that the standard consumer of
the game, a boy aged 17.5 years, would regard the two games as
substantially similar. The district court held that the defendant's
game unlawfully appropriated the "total feel and concept" of the
plaintiff's game and thus infringed Data East's copyright. The dis-
trict court recognized that the idea behind the two games was iden-
tical, and that the visual depiction of karate matches is subject to
the constraints inherent in the sport of karate and in the use of the
game on the Commodore computer. However, the court did not
find the idea and expression so inseparable as to escape the infringe-
ment claim.4 The issues of infringement of trademark and trade
dress were summarily dismissed, and the injunction was granted.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's hold-
3. The district court referred to System III Software instead of Epyx because System
III Software was the actual developer of the video game. Epyx was named as the defendant
instead of System III Software because Epyx had licensed the video game from System III
Software and distributed it in the United States.
4. The operation of the video game on the Commodore computer produced such con-
straints as the use of sprites, a limited availability of color, and limitations on the use of
multiple colors upon one visual image. Data East, 862 F.2d at 209. A "sprite" involves the
use of a special technique for creating mobile graphic images on a computer screen that is
appropriate for animation. An increase in sophistication of sprite techniques used in the
computer program will increase the graphic quality of the game's animation. Id. at 209, n.5.
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ing. The opinion by Justice Trott addressed the issues of sufficiency
of the evidence5 and the claim of copyright infringement. In his
analysis of copyright infringement, Justice Trott relied on the test
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Sid and Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation,6 known as the "Krofft
test." Under the Krofft test, a plaintiff will succeed in a claim for
copyright infringement if he proves the following: a) ownership of
the copyright; and b) "copying" by the defendant. Copying can be
demonstrated by a finding of 1) circumstantial evidence of access 7
to the copyrighted work; and 2) substantial similarity between the
copyrighted work and the defendant's work. Furthermore, substan-
tial similarity is dependent upon the outcome of two additional
tests: i) the "extrinsic" test; and ii) the "intrinsic" test.'
The extrinsic test employs an objective approach to determine
whether the ideas behind two works are similar. The focus in this
test is not on the trier of fact, but instead on specific criteria, such as
the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter,
and the setting for the subject.9 Because the extrinsic test empha-
sizes analytic analysis of criterion beyond the work itself, expert tes-
timony is appropriate. The question may be decided as a matter of
law. 10 The intrinsic test, on the other hand, relies on a more subjec-
tive approach to ascertain whether substantial similarity exists in
the expression of the two works. Application of the intrinsic test
focuses on the "ordinary reasonable person" most likely to purchase
or consume the product,"' and whether this person would find that
the "total concept and feel" of the two works reflects a substantial
similarity. Typically, analytic analysis and expert testimony are not
5. With respect to the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, the court found that viewing
still photographs (as opposed to Data East's original arcade game, which depicts all images
and all moves that occur when the game sequences through the various skill levels), along
with testimony, constituted sufficient evidence of the contents of the arcade game's audio-
visual work to make a fair comparison with Epyx's game. The court thus concluded that the
district court had not committed plain error by viewing only the still photographs. Id. at
206-07.
6. Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977). This test was first announced in the Second Circuit's decision, Arnstein
v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2nd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947), and was
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the Krofft decision. For further discussion of the "extrinsic"
and "intrinsic" tests see Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823
F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1987).
7. The Ninth Circuit defined "access" as "an opportunity to view or to copy plaintiffs
work." See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172.
8. This test in its entirety is referred to as the Krofft test.
9. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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appropriate under this test. The outcome of the test is left to the
trier of fact.
As in the lower court, there was no dispute with respect to
whether Data East owned the copyright to "Karate Champ," and
Justice Trott moved directly to the issue of copying. In one conclu-
sive statement Justice Trott declined to address the issue of access
because he did not find substantial similarity between the plaintiff's
and defendant's videogames. In a later portion of the opinion Jus-
tice Trott states that Epyx never had access to Data East's home
game version of "Karate Champ." However, he does acknowledge
the district court's finding that Data East's home-computer game
was an adaptation of its arcade game. Thus, had Justice Trott de-
cided the access issue, it is speculative whether he would have found
that Epyx had access to Data East's program.
Justice Trott then moved to the issue of substantial similarity.
He began his analysis by reviewing the well-known concept that
ideas themselves are not protected by copyright, and therefore, can-
not be infringed; only the author's expression is protectable under
the copyright laws."2 He then applied the "extrinsic" and "intrin-
sic" tests established in Krofft. In applying the extrinsic test, Justice
Trott relied on the district court's findings that plaintiff's and de-
fendant's games both encompassed the identical idea of a martial
arts karate combat match, citing the district court's description of
the videogames.' 3
The court went on to consider the intrinsic test to determine
whether the expression of the two games was substantially similar.
However, Justice Trott went beyond the typical application of the
intrinsic test and followed the approach developed by the Ninth
Circuit in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co. 4 The usual approach of the
intrinsic test was to ignore analytic dissection and expert testimony
and rely only on subjective factors. Instead, Justice Trott integrated
the principle that "no substantial similarity of expression will be
found when 'the idea and its expression are inseparable' ,,s into the
12. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which
codified the concept expressed in Mazer.
13. The district court had described the idea behind the videogames as, "a martial arts
karate combat game conducted between two combatants and presided over by a referee, all of
which are represented by visual images and providing a method of scoring accomplished by
full and half point scores for each player, and utilizing dots to depict full point scores and half
point scores." Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., No. 14231 at 20 (D.C. Cal. 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
14. Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th dir. 1987).
15. The expanded intrinsic test developed in Aliotti stated that "no substantial similar-
ity may be found under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates that all simi-
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intrinsic test. The Justice went on to say that to the extent that it is
necessary to determine whether similarities result from unprotect-
able expression, it is appropriate under Krofft's intrinsic test to per-
form analytic dissection of similarities. 6 The court thus
incorporated into the intrinsic test an analytical dissection of all
similarities, whether protectable by copyright or not.17 If all simi-
larities in expressions arise from the use of common ideas, then no
substantial similarity can be found.
Applying this new test to the facts, Justice Trott emphasized
what the district court failed to regard in its final ruling. Whereas
the district court discounted the import of their finding that the vis-
ual depiction of karate matches is subject to the constraints inherent
in the sport of karate, Justice Trott focused on this finding. The
constraints recognized by Justice Trott included the number of
combatants, the moves and motions of the combatants, and the
method of scoring. Justice Trott also considered the limitations
arising from operation of the home-video karate game on the Com-
modore computer system. The fifteen features listed by the lower
court "' were found to encompass features essential to the game pro-
cedure, the moves which constitute the sport of karate, the com-
puter graphics, the constraints found in depicting the sport of
karate or the utilization of the computer system. Justice Trott then
stated that "after careful consideration and viewing of the features,
we find that they necessarily follow from the idea of a martial arts
karate combat game, or are inseparable from, indispensable to, or
even standard treatment of the idea of the karate sport."' 9 When
expressions and ideas coincide, protection will be granted only if
exact copying is found.2" Because the court found no incident of
identical copying, and specifically stated that the programmers'
contribution to the game - the background - was distinct, it con-
cluded that the district court had erred by not limiting the scope of
larities in expression arise from the use of common ideas." The new test is based on the
principle developed in a line of cases cited in Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167-68. These cases in-
cluded Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); Lands-
berg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1037, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984) (factual works); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141,
143 (9th Cir. 1983) (scenes a faire doctrine).
16. Data East, 862 F.2d at 208.
17. See Aliottisupra note 14 at 901, citing McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d
316, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the court states that all textual material, even that
which is not copyrightable, should be considered to determine copyright infringement.
18. See supra note 2.
19. Data East, 862 F.2d at 209.
20. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162.
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plaintiff's copyright. Furthermore, Justice Trott concluded that a
discerning boy age 17.5 years would not regard the works as sub-
stantially similar. The court thus reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court and remanded the case for the lifting of the injunction.
The Ninth Circuit's approach in reviewing the Data East case
should promote conformity in the lower courts by demonstrating
the proper analysis for audio-visual copyright infringement cases,
despite some irregularity in analysis. Justice Trott's failure to ad-
dress the issue of access may at first appear as a distortion of the
traditional Krofft test, which requires that both access and substan-
tial similarity be independantly established.2' It is typical in copy-
right infringement cases for the court to begin its analysis by
considering the issue of access, because it is often easily decided.
However, the Krofft court did discuss the substantial similarity in
the two works before turning to whether the defendant had access
to the plaintiff's work, thus indicating that the order of review of the
two requirements is unimportant. Although in Data East it appears
that Justice Trott disposed of the access issue before turning to the
issue of substantial similarity, he had already concluded that no
substantial similarity existed. It is likely he considered a discussion
of access to be a waste of time. In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit stated
that, "no amount of proof of access will suffice to show copying if
there are no substantial similarities."22 Thus, even if Epyx had di-
rect access to Data East's underlying program of "Karate Champ,"
such access would not provide a ground for copyright infringement
if the two videogames were not found to be substantially similar.
The expanded intrinsic test which Justice Trott relied upon
should prove to be a more concise means of establishing whether
the expression of the two works is substantially similar. Prior to
Aliotti, the Ninth Circuit applied the basic intrinsic test adopted in
Krofft, which considered subjective factors in establishing similarity
of expression and avoided analytic dissection. In a separate discus-
sion the court analyzed whether the expression of the work and the
idea of the work were indistinguishable. After completing each
21. However, in rare cases, "if.. .the similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's
works is sufficiently striking and substantial, the trier of fact may be permitted to infer copy-
ing notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to prove access." See M. Nimmer, supra note I, at
§ 13.02[B]. Presumably, the court would have explored the access issue more fully had it
found sustantial similarity between the two works.
22. The court inAliotti, 831 F.2d 898, relied on Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172, and M. Nim-
mer, supra note 1, at § 13.031D] in stating that "clear and convincing evidence of access will
not avoid the necessity of also proving substantial similarity since access without similarity
cannot create an inference of copying."
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analysis, the court would decide whether substantial similarity in
expression existed. In Aliotti the court recognized that the issue of
"inseparability of idea and expression" had never been integrated
into the Krofft intrinsic test. Because the issue of "inseparability"
involves elements of expression, the court assimilated this analysis
into the intrinsic test. Under this expanded version of the test, the
court determined that it was appropriate to perform analytic dissec-
tion of similarities, thus negating the old principles of the intrinsic
test. However, the intrinsic test maintained the subjective element,
which considers the opinion of the ordinary consumer. This new
test should facilitate the court's review and provide a more cohesive
analysis of similarity of expression.
Opponents of this new test may argue that it presents other
difficulties in deciding copyright infringement cases. By expanding
the intrinsic test to include analytical considerations of whether the
expression is identical to the idea itself, the line distinguishing the
intrinsic and extrinsic tests is blurred. Greater weight is placed on
objective factors rather than subjective, and because the similarity
between objective factors has been generally regarded as a question
of law, the issue of substantial similarity is decided in great part by
the judge and not the jury.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Data East was success-
ful in aligning the outcomes of audio-visual infringement cases.
Justice Trott's holding in Data East conforms with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in another audio-visual copyright infringement case,
Frybarger v. International Business Machines Corporation,23 whose
facts resembled those of Data East.
In Frybarger, Anothony Frybarger was employed by Nasir
Gebelli and the company, Gebelli Software, Inc. (Gebelli). Pursu-
ant to a confidential disclosure agreement, Frybarger submitted to
Gebelli design drawings and a flow chart describing his newly de-
veloped video game "Tricky Trapper," and in September and No-
vember of 1982, upon request, provided Gebelli with a playable disk
of "Tricky Trapper.' 24 Throughout the period that Frybarger was
submitting his ideas to Gebelli, Gebelli was providing consulting
services to IBM with respect to the development of electronic video
game programming for the IBM personal computer. On November
19, 1982, Gebelli submitted to IBM two storyboards for proposed
video games. One of the video games developed by Gebelli was
"Mouser," to which Gebelli registered the copyrights. IBM subse-
23. Frybarger v. International Business Machines Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
24. "Tricky Trapper" was compatible with the Apple Computer.
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quently began marketing "Mouser." Frybarger registered the copy-
rights to "Tricky Trapper" in 1984.
In 1985 Frybarger brought an action in district court alleging
copyright infringement against IBM, Nasir Gabelli, and Gabelli
Software, Inc. Frybarger also argued that such infringement consti-
tuted unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.2"
IBM's motion for summary judgement and judgement on the plead-
ings was granted. Frybarger appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the copyright infringe-
ment claim to determine whether the decision to dispose of the case
on summary judgement was appropriate. The court applied the
Krofft test26 to determine whether a claim for copyright infringe-
ment could be established. Gebelli and IBM conceded that
Frybarger owned the copyright to "Tricky Trapper" and that
Gebelli had direct access to the "Tricky Trapper" design. How-
ever, with respect to the substantial similarity prong of the "copy-
ing" test, the court placed great weight on its determination that
many of the similarities between Frybarger's and Gabelli's works
were confined to ideas and general concepts, and hence stated:
Although there are numerous similar features in Frybarger's and
Gebelli's works, we believe that each of the similar features con-
stitutes a basic idea of the videogames and, to the extent each
feature is expressive, that the expression is 'as a practical matter
indispensable, or at least standard in the treatment of a given
[idea]. These ideas, like all ideas are not protected by
copyright.' 27
Because indispensible expression of ideas is so close to the non-
protectable idea itself, it can only be protected against identical
copying.2" The court found that Gebelli's "Mouser" was not an
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In Frybarger, the court refrained from
using the words "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" and instead discussed the similarities between the
"ideas" and the "expressions." The Frybarger court thus avoided the problem of amending
the "intrinsic" prong of the substantial similarity test, unlike the court in Data East.
27. Frybarger, 812 F.2d at 529-530, citing Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
sumer EIecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982), ('scenes a faire" doctrine which re-
lates to "expression.. .which necessarily results from the fact that the common idea is only
capable of expression in more or less stereotyped form."). See also Krofft 562 F.2d at 1163;
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971), ('When
the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred,
since protecting the 'expression'in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea'
upon the copyright owner.").
28. Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157; Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d 738.
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identical copy of "Tricky Trapper" and affirmed the decision of the
district court.
The Ninth Circuit decision in Frybarger directly contradicted
the district court's holding in Data East. Although there was no
question that the Ninth Circuit's method of analysis would control,
the discrepant conclusions demonstrated that a concrete approach
in reviewing audio-visual cases had yet to be established. The dis-
crepancies created an aura of unpredictability with respect to the
amount of copyright protection which would be afforded video
games. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Data East demonstrates that
the court intends to analyze audio-visual infringement cases by ap-
plying the Krofft test, which now entails considering the degree of
inseparability between idea and expression.
Although the Ninth Circuit's review of the case was consistent
with the court's decision in Frybarger, Data East has requested a
rehearing by the full Ninth Circuit. Data East argues that the court
erroneously concluded that the "substantial similarities" were based
on inherent constraints arising from the sport of karate and the use
of the Commodore computer, and claims that the features of the
game were based on creative decision.2 9 The creative aspects of the
game include the opponent's ability to somersault, which is not an
actual move in karate; the use of bonus rounds, not found in an
actual karate match; and the potential for numerous color combina-
tions in the screen illustration of the game.3° Data East contends
that the court's decision is in direct conflict with other cases decided
by that circuit, as well as other circuits, including the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labora-
tory, Inc.,31 and requests that the Ninth Circuit either rehear or
remand the case for a determination of which expressions are not
constrained by the sport of karate or the computer.
However, by relying on Whelan, Data East may be acting to its
own detriment. Although the court in Whelan placed great empha-
sis on the similarity of the structure, sequence and organization of
the underlying program, thus indicating copying, the case was one
in which the defendant had clear access to the plaintiff's source
code. In Data East the appellate court's refusal to address the ac-
cess issue distinguishes this case from Whelan. The evidence pro-
29. Data East Requests 'Look and Feel" Rehearing, COMPUTER LAW & TAX REPORT,
Vol. 15, No. 8, 4-5 (Mar. 1989).
30. Id.
31. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir.
1986), cert denied 107 S. Ct. 377.
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duced at the district court was inconclusive as to whether System
III Software had access to Data East's underlying program.
Although the district court determined that the wide dissemination
of the "Karate Champ" arcade game provided enough circumstan-
tial evidence to rule that System III Software had access to Data
East's program, direct evidence also demonstrated that System III
Software had developed a more sophisticated program for "World
Karate Championship" than was used by Data East in "Karate
Champ." This difference between the two video games' underlying
programs may be enough to establish that each program embodies a
unique structure, sequence and organization. Thus, no copying by
the defendant would be found. The Ninth Circuit would have to
resolve the access issue if it were to rehear or remand the case.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Data East provides some hope
that the court has succeeded in determining exactly which portions
of an audio-visual work will be protected, thus creating some con-
sistancy when it considers the similarities between two works. The
ruling confirms the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions which reduce the
degree of protection afforded audio-visual works. However, there is
a continued guarantee that an author's expressions which extend
beyond the idea of the work will be guarded from copyright in-
fringement. The Data East decision is only one step toward uni-
formity in the "look and feel" arena. However, it provides promise
that the courts will continue to align subsequent case law and elimi-
nate the confusion once and for all.
Celeste Elizabeth Andersen
1989]

NEC Corp. v. INTEL Corp.: A BRIEF SYNOPSIS
On February 7, 1989, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Gray, J., held that: (1) the Intel
microcode for its 8086 and 8088 microprocessors were the proper
subjects for protection under the United States copyright laws; (2)
Intel did forfeit the above copyrights it had obtained because (a)
more than a relatively small number of copies of product distrib-
uted by its authority did not contain the copyright notice prescribed
by 17 U.S.C. § 401, (b) Intel failed to make a reasonable effort to
cause such notice to be added to those copies after the omission had
been discovered within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 405 and (c)
those copies were distributed at times when no express requirement
in writing, within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 405, mandated such
marking; (3) the microcodes that NEC produced for its V20, V30,
V40 and V50 microprocessors do not infringe the Intel copyrights
for its 8086 and 8088 microcodes and (4) NEC's V20 and V30
microprocessors are not simply "improvements" upon its [LPD 8086
and [LPD 8088 microprocessors, which were licensed by Intel under
its copyrights.'
This new holding presents some substantial changes from that
previously rendered by Judge Ingram in 1986.2 While Judge Gray
agreed that microcode is properly subject to copyrightability as a
computer program, he disagreed with Judge Ingram's statutory in-
terpretation of "relatively small" and "reasonable effort" with re-
gard to the number of chips distributed without copyright notice
and Intel's efforts to remedy the omissions. Additionally, while
Judge Ingram never reached the issues of "infringement" and
"mere improvement" in the former case, Judge Gray provided a
comprehensive analysis of microprocessor design and the con-
straints placed on object code and source code by that design.
What happens relatively early in the research and development of
the chip may determine what constitutes infringement or improve-
ment. This casenote will briefly review the procedural history of the
case, the development of the legal issues involved and then focus on
the analysis of those issues as presented by Judge Gray.
1. NEC Corp. v. INTEL Corp., No. C-84-207-99-WPG, slip op. at 2-3 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 7, 1989)[hereinafter "OPINION"].
2. NEC Corp. v. INTEL Corp., 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December of 1984, NEC Corporation, a Japanese electron-
ics corporation and its California counterpart brought an action for
declaratory relief against INTEL Corporation, a California elec-
tronics corporation. NEC sought a declaration that defendant's
copyrights in its 8086 and 8088 microprocessors were invalid and/
or not infringed by plaintiffs' microcode and sought an injunction
against enforcement thereof by defendant, or alternatively, that
plaintiffs were licensees under defendant's copyright. Defendant
counterclaimed to enjoin the infringement of its copyrights. The
District Court bifurcated plaintiffs' additional claim for unfair com-
petition for trial. The District Court, Ingram, J., held that: (1) de-
fendant had good, valid and existing copyrights on its computer
microcode, and (2) defendant made reasonable efforts to add re-
quired notices to all copies distributed to the public after discover-
ing the omission to publish the copyright notice, and was therefore
excused of omission.3
Yet, before INTEL could pop the cork on the champagne,
NEC moved for disqualification of Judge Ingram under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a), and (b)(4) on the basis that he held an $80.00 interest in
Intel stock purchased through Mercedes Investment Fund - an
investment club. The District Court, Schwarzer, J., held that
§ 455(b)(4) did not require disqualification from "inception" be-
cause Judge Ingram did not know he had an interest in a party until
NEC notified him of that fact. Nor did section 455(a) require dis-
qualification from that date because Judge Ingram's interest, con-
sidering its size and remoteness, was too slight to raise a reasonable
question as to his impartiality. Finally, prospective disqualification
was not required because Judge Ingram had since divested himself
of the Intel shares.4
However, NEC appealed Judge Schwarzer's ruling to the
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. Almost a year later and
around the time the Circuit Court was expected to make a decision,
Judge Ingram entered an order recusing himself and vacating his
prior orders and rulings. The appeal was dismissed and the order of
the district court from which the appeal was taken was vacated on
the basis of mootness.5 In other words, Judge Ingram indirectly
3. Id
4. NEC Corp. v. INTEL Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
5. NEC Corp. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
835 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988).
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granted NEC the opportunity to replay the game, this time with a
different ending.
THE LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED
Copyrightability Of Microcode
The fundamental issue of the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams has been settled since 1983.6 However, it is also settled that
computer hardware is not copyrightable but only patentable. 7 Part
of the problem here lies in the fact that microcode fits neatly into
neither category. Rather, microcode (often referred to as
microprograms) is often classified in a hybrid category of its own
known as "firmware." 8 Therefore, the first issue in this case was
whether the proper legal protection to be afforded firmware such as
the Intel Microcode is under the patent or copyright law.
Forfeiture Of Copyright
The second issue to be decided at trial was whether Intel had
forfeited its alleged copyrights. To maintain copyright protection in
the United States the Copyright Act provides that:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a
notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on
all publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visu-
ally perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. 9
The failure by the copyright owner to affix such notice invalidates
the copyright unless as provided in § 405(a):
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively
small number of copies; or (2)... a reasonable effort is made to
add notice to all copies.., that are distributed to the public...
after the omission has been discovered; or (3) the notice has been
omitted in violation of an express requirement in writing that...
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[F]
(1986); FINAL REPORT, COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHT
WORKS ("CONTU") at 20.
8. Firmware: Software that is stored in hardware form. The term is generally applied
to a small integrated circuit (IC) that has been imprinted with a program (i.e., software) and
is wired into a computer. See also PATTERSON, MICROPROGRAMMING, 248 Sc. AM. 50
(March 1983).
9. 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(c) (1977).
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the... copies... bear the prescribed notice.1 °
The court's analysis of these three defenses is presented below.
Infringement
The third issue to be decided at trial was, assuming Intel held
valid copyrights in its microcode, whether NEC's microcode in-
fringed upon those copyrights. Copyright infringement consists of
two basic elements: (a) proof that the defendant copied from the
plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b) proof that the copying went so
far as to constitute improper appropriation. Both elements are
necessary and neither alone is sufficient. The second element, show-
ing what was copied and how much, is referred to as the substantial
similarity test. To satisfy this test, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that defendant's expression in his work is substantially
similar to the protected expression in plaintiff's work. 12 "Just as
copying is an essential element of infringement, so substantial simi-
larity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's works is an essen-
tial element of copying."1 " However, among the many mechanisms
that copyright law provides to limit the exclusive rights of a copy-
right owner is the idea-expression doctrine now codified in § 102(b)
of the Act.14 This section provides that copyright protection does
not extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle or discovery."15 This doctrine is less a
limitation on the copyrightability of a work and more a measure of
the degree of similarity which must exist between a protected work
and an unauthorized copy in order to constitute infringement.1 6
Since Judge Ingram never reached this question, Judge Gray's anal-
ysis was one of first impression in this case.
The nature of a copyrighted work has a direct bearing on the
degree of similarity which will result in a finding of infringement.
Thus, "if the only original aspect of a work lies in its literal expres-
sion, then only a very close similarity, verging on the identical, will
10. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (emphasis added).
11. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation, 562
F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977).
12. d at 1164. "If there is substantial similarity in ideas, then the trier of fact must
decide whether there is substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute
infringement." Id
13. 3 M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1986).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1980).
15. Id'
16. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D] (1986).
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suffice to constitute an infringing copy." 17
Challenged Microcode "Improvements"
The fourth and final issue decided by this case, and an alterna-
tive argument asserted by NEC, was whether NEC's V20 and V30
microprocessors were nothing more than "improvements" upon the
pPD 8086 and [tPD 8088, and therefore covered by the licensing
agreement between the two parties. If found to be mere improve-
ments, this argument would circumvent any infringement claims.
ANALYSIS
Copyrightability Of Microcode
The court offered a straightforward analysis concerning a topic
which, until now, appeared rather perplexing. As stated earlier,
microcode has been and continues to be difficult to classify under
either of the traditional categories of hardware (subject only to pat-
ent protection) and software (subject mainly to copyright protec-
tion). The court, building on the reasoning in Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp. 18, stated, "A computer program, even
though articulated in object code, is afforded copyright protection
as a 'literary work'; under Section 101, which includes works 'ex-
pressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects.., in which
they are embodied.'-"9
In short, the court gave the statute a literal interpretation. For
any particular work to be copyrightable, it must meet two require-
ments: the work must be "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion," and it must be "original". 0 Neither side disputed the fact
that Intel's microcode is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
However, NEC challenged the originality of the microcode and the
classification of the chip as non-hardware. NEC relied on Professor
Nimmer's statement that "[i]llustrative of the requirement of mini-
mal creativity are those cases which deny copyright protection to
fragmentary words or phrases, non-creative variations of musical
compositions and to forms of expression dictated solely by func-
tional considerations."2 The specific segments which NEC pointed
to were relatively short and consisted of only a few obvious steps.
17. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1986)
18. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
19. OPINION at 3. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101.
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
21. M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 2.01[B].
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Nevertheless, the court agreed with Intel's reasoning that any
copyrighted work, regardless of form or permutation, may be
"chopped into parts that could be said to have very few creative
steps."22 The meaning of "originality" for purposes of copyright-
ability" means only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e.,
was independently created, and not copied from other works," and
that the work contained a modicum of originality, i.e., "exceeds
that required for a fragmentary work or short phrase."23 While
Congress amended the Act in 1980 to specifically list computer pro-
grams among the examples of copyrightable material defined in
§ 101, Judge Gray implied that the Intel microcode qualified with-
out such congressional assistence.
NEC also made the technical argument that Intel's microcode
did not come within the definition of a computer program because it
cannot be used both in and as a defining part of the computer (stat-
ing that the computer cannot function independently of the
microprocessor.) However, as stated by General Counsel for Intel
Corporation,
Once created, microcode can be stored in a variety of media,
such as paper, floppy disks or semiconductor chips. Intel's
microprograms were embedded in ROM24 on the microproces-
sor chip, as are many computer programs. ... The court in this
dispute, however, followed the clear ruling in (Apple v. Frank-
lin)25, that a computer program, even when embedded in a ROM
chip, is copyrightable. The (Franklin) court emphasized that the
storage modality of a program does not change the nature of the
program.
26
Judge Gray then addressed NEC's substantial similarity argu-
ment from the standpoint of practicality. NEC contended that if
substantial similarities existed between its accused microroutines
and those of Intel, the similarities may be explained by "constraints
that severely limit the ways in which the 'ideas' therein contained
can be expressed. NEC therefore urges that such merger of idea
and expression forestalls copyrightability."27 Judge Gray con-
22. OPINION at 5.
23. M. NIMMER, supra note 7 at § 2.01[A] and [B].
24. Read Only Memory (ROM): This is memory containing programs or data that the
computer may only read, not add to or change. This memory is imprinted on a chip in an
elaborate and expensive procedure that cannot be altered.
25. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251.
26. Dunlap, NEC V INTEL: A CHALLENGE TO THE DEVELOPING LA wf OF COPYRIGHT
IN THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS, 3 SC COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. 3. 3, 6
(1987).
27. OPINION at 7.
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cluded that while the Ninth Circuit has not specifically discussed
this issue, it appears to reach the "merger" question only on the
issue of infringement. In other words, the question of merger does
not affect the copyrightability of plaintiff's expression but merger
does affect the issue of infringement by defendant. As Judge Gray
states in his opinion, as a matter of practicality, the Register of
Copyrights will be unable to determine at the time of issuance
whether or not the constraints on a particular expression are sub-
stantial enough to amount to merger. "The burden of showing such
constraints should be left to the alleged infringer."2
Forfeiture Of Copyright
On forfeiture, the court dramatically diverged from Judge In-
gram's prior opinion. On the issue of 17 U.S.C. § 401(a)(1) - "rel-
atively small number of copies", the court found that "Intel allowed
a relatively large number of copies of its microcode to be distributed
to the public without the prescribed copyright notice. . . ."" Ac-
cording to Intel's admissions, approximately 2, 984,000 copies of its
microcode, or about 10.6%, did not contain the required copyright
notice. While the court considered analyzing this number in its ab-
solute sense, it stated that the statute appears to require the term
"relatively small number" to be considered by means of comparison
or percentage. Both parties recognized the significance of this issue
as well. While Intel stated that the number was relatively small
with respect to the total number produced30 , NEC made the more
persuasive argument, and as restated by the court:
An examination of twenty federal court decisions that have
considered the matter discloses none in which 10.6% was held to
be a relatively small number. The highest percentage found to
have been within the exception is 9%, but in that case the
number of items without the affixed notice was only 208, as com-
pared with the almost 3,000,000 here involved [citation]. In con-
trast, as few as 2,500, which made up only 2.4% of the total
distributed, have been held to be more than a relatively small
number. See Donald Frederick Evans v. Continental Homes, Inc.,
785 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1986). It also is worthy of note that
the opinion concluded that "2,500 copies is a significant number
in the absolute sense." Id.31
28. OPINION at 8.
29. OPINION at 9.
30. Dunlap, supra note 26, at 9.
31. OPINION at 10.
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Nevertheless, the decision reached by Judge Ingram in his partial
findings of fact, as well as both the analyses applied by this court
and those cited by it, reaffirm that "relatively small" must be deter-
mined on a case by case basis.
The court next turned to the issue of § 405(a)(2) "reasonable
effort." In its analysis, the court relied on a self-imposed five part
test: (1) When discovery of the failure to add the notice occurred;
(2) the elapsed time between such discovery and the commencement
of corrective action; (3) the reasonable sufficiency of the corrective
action; (4) the extent of any follow-up to determine implementation
by the licensees, and (5) the quantity of copies distributed to the
public between discovery and corrective action.
Section 408(a)(2) provided that publication without notice will
not invalidate the copyright if:
registration for the work has been made before or is made within
five years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable
effort is made to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are
distributed to the public in the United States after the omission
has been discovered.32
However, in 1988 the Berne Convention Implementation Act
amended 17 U.S.C.S. § 401 (1988) to alter subsection (b) and add
subsection (d). Basically, under the amendment (effective March 1,
1989), a copyright holder who does not comply with the affixation
requirement does not lose his copyright. A copyright holder who
does comply is deemed to have given notice to all. In other words,
compliance by the copyright holder eliminates any innocent in-
fringement defense that an infringer may formerly have raised.
Intel licensed twelve companies to manufacture, use and sell its
8086/88 microprocessors containing its microcode. However, three
of these, including NEC, contained no mention whatever of an obli-
gation to affix a copyright notice. Judge Ingram agreed with Intel,
that since these licensees had drafted the licenses, the omission of
notice was due to inadvertence and excusable mistake. Judge Gray
took a harder line stating, ". . .such an oversight certainly is rele-
vant evidence that protection of its copyright was not high on In-
tel's list of priorities when the licenses were issued." 3
Additionally, while Intel claimed to not have acquired knowl-
edge until February of 1985 that these licensees were not properly
affixing the copyright, the court pointed to direct evidence that on
32. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)(2).
33. OPIoN at 12.
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several occasions Intel was either aware or on notice that it had not
obliged its licensees to affix an appropriate copyright mark. It was
this lack of diligence regarding terms that any "reasonably alert li-
censor" would have been concerned about which troubles the court.
Despite this lack of diligence, the court was willing to accept the
1985 date as that of Intel's first notice, as the later date ultimately
helped Intel's case very little. As stated above, the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act, as amending 17 U.S.C.S § 401 (1988),
will have a substantial effect on the notice issue as analyzed by
Judge Gray. The point in all liklihood is now moot.
The analysis next moved to the "reasonableness" of Intel's cor-
rective efforts. The court focused on Intel's history of dealing
among three licensees on the notice of copyright issue. In each of
the three cases (concerning Fujitsu, Oki and Harris), the court
found that Intel had been lax in either implementation of the cor-
rective measures or followup. Often there was a six month turn-
around between letters to licensees requesting compliance and any
response or followup to see if they had in fact complied. Intel went
so far as to provide some of its licensees with stickers to be applied
by distributors to the chips already in stock. However, Intel never
offered to offset the distributors' application costs and the court
could find no evidence of any of the stickers having been applied.
Intel's slow start in implementing corrective measures, combined
with little or no followup substantially increased the number of cop-
ies distributed without notices between the time of discovery and
correction by Intel. Ultimately, the court disagreed with Intel and
Judge Ingram's prior finding and stated that while Congress was
aware that copyright protection should not be removed unless the
interests of justice clearly require such action, "if the words 'reason-
able effort' are to have any substantial meaning, Intel's conduct here
simply cannot be held to have met that standard." 4
Finally, the court only briefly studied the defense in 405(a)(3)
of an express written requirement of marking. The licenses issued
to Fujitsu, Mitsubishi and NEC contained no requirement whatso-
ever concerning a copyright notice. The licenses to three others
stated only that the licensees would affix copyright notice on prod-
ucts distributed by them if Intel so requested. "Such a provision
certainly is not an 'express requirement in writing' within the mean-
ing of Section 405(a)(3). ' ' 35 Again, the court appears to have fo-
cused on Intel's lack of diligence stating that even among these last
34. OPINION at 18.
35. OPINION at 19.
1989]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURN4L
three licensees, Intel did not request aflfixation until somewhat after
April, 1985.
Infringement
For Intel to make a prima facie case of infringement, it must
(1) have a valid copyright; (2) establish access by NEC to the copy-
righted microcode and (3) show substantial similarity between the
two microcodes. Intel did obtain a valid copyright, and NEC ad-
mitted access to Intel's microcode pursuant to the licensing agree-
ment between the two parties. Thus, the court was left to determine
the issue of substantial similarity.36
As stated by Robert C. Hinckley, general counsel for NEC:
The Intel Microcode is 512 lines long and each line is 21 bits
wide. The NEC Microcode is 1024 lines long, and each line is 29
bits wide.37
Mr. Hinckley continues:
Not all of the 1024 lines in the NEC Microcode are used for
the 8086 instruction set. Of the total 1024 lines, 472 were de-
voted to other purposes: 168 to run original NEC instructions
which are not found in any Intel products; 116 for the Intel
80188/80186 instructions which can be run on the V-Series; and
188 for emulation of the 8080 microprocessor. Intel made no
claim that any of these parts of the NEC Microcode infringed
any Intel copyright. The remaining 552 lines of the NEC
Microcode are devoted to carrying out the 8086 instruction set
and are the focus of Intel's allegations. 38
While the above-mentioned specifics aren't mentioned in the court's
opinion, they were included in the evidence presented by NEC at
trial. While the court might have elected to dissect the two codes
and break each down into component parts, the court followed the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Atari Inc. v. North American
Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp.,9 which states, "When analyzing two
works to determine whether they are substantially similar, courts
should be careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees." Using
this approach, the court concluded that "the NEC microcode (Re-
vision 2), when considered as a whole, is not substantially similar to
36. Id.
37. Hinckley, NEC V INTEL: Will Hardware Be Drawn into the Black Hole of Copy-
right?, 3 SC COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 47-48 (1987).
38. Id. at 48.
39. 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the Intel microcode within the meaning of the copyright laws."'
The court stated first that none of the microroutines are identi-
cal. Of course, infringement does not require them to be. However,
most of the similarities were in the shorter, simpler routines. These
routines involved straightforward operations in which close similar-
ity in approach was not only not surprising but to be expected. The
court also concluded, based on its own perusal of the two
microcodes and the conflicting testimony of the experts, "that the
ordinary observer, considering the accused microcode as a whole,
would not recognize it as having been taken from the copyrighted
source." 41 However, as stated in Whelan, the court was obligated
to make a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about the charac-
ter of the work as a whole and the importance of the substantially
similar portions of the work. This approach recognized the fact
that some routines, though short in length may nevertheless be very
important. The question then becomes, whether they are the result
of actionable copying.
Intel advanced five theories of copying by NEC. Intel asserted
that NEC's Mr. Kaneko, the microprogrammer, was not exper-
ienced enough to have produced so complicated a program in so
short a time with so few notes; that NEC has admitted copying; that
certain errors in the original Intel microcode also appear, inexplica-
bly in the NEC microcode (the so-called "Patch"); that NEC failed
to meaningfully exploit its more advanced technology, such as the
increased capacity of its newer chip, the use of the Dual Bus, the
use of Intel's groupings and NEC's treatment of certain illegal
groupings. Intel also asserted the inexplicable similarity of several
microsequences (the RESET microsequence, the DAA/DAS and
the XLAT).
The court addressed each of these arguments in order. While
admittedly giving great weight to the parties' use of expert testi-
mony, ultimately the court had to reach its own conclusions. The
court seemed particularly impressed with the similarities between
the Clean Room microcode42 and the other two, as well as the argu-
ment that the technical constraints of the project inherently lead to
similarities. Given the emphasis on performance, the limited com-
plexity of the 8086 microinstructions and limited choices with the
40. OPIMON at 20.
41. OPINION at 22.
42. A third microcode version was commissioned to see if an engineer, working inde-
pendently from the other two versions but under similar technical "constraints" would com-
pose a similar microcode. The court and the parties referred to this third version as the
"clean room" microcode.
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given microarchitecture, many sequences should look the same. In
other words, under these circumstances, using engineers of like ex-
perience and qualification should arrive at virtually identical
microcode.
The court treated these similar expressions as subject to the
doctrine of merger between idea and expression. As previously
stated by Judge Gray, a merger argument, as asserted by NEC to
thwart Intel's microcode copyright, cannot meaningfully apply at
the copyright stage. However, this argument resurfaces here when
examining the separate issue of infringement. While ideas are not
copyrightable, particular and original expressions by an author are
copyrightable. This idea-expression dichotomy is useful in recon-
ciling two competing social interests, the encouragement of individ-
ual creative effort and the public's need for free access to ideas. As
discussed above, this idea-expression dichotomy has been codified in
§ 102(b) of the Act. The House Report addresses the applicability
of this section to computer programs when it states:
Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear
that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyright-
able element in a computer program, and that the actual process
or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of
the copyright law.43
As explained by Ronald S. Laurie and Stephen M. Everett:
The idea-expression dichotomy is not so much a limitation on
the copyrightability of works, as it is a measure of the degree of
similarity which must exist between a copyrighted work and an
unauthorized "copy" in order to constitute infringement. Given
the copyrightability of a work, the idea-expression dichotomy
serves to differentiate those aspects of the work that may be
freely appropriated by others (the ideas) from those that may not
(the expression). Thus, the idea-expression dichotomy is essen-
tially a defendant's doctrine, used to argue that any similarities
between the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works result
from the use of the same ideas and not from the misappropria-
tion of protected expression. 44
The court concluded that the expression of the ideas underly-
ing the shorter (simpler) microroutines, if protected at all, were pro-
tected only against virtually identical copying and "that NEC
43. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, September 3, 1976, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 54 at 57 (H.
Rep.), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at p. 5659.
44. Laurie and Everett, The Coprightability of Microcode: Is It Software Or Hardware
... Or Both, 2:3 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 9 (March 1985).
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properly used the underlying ideas, without virtually identically
copying their limited expression."" As the court stated, "The Clean
Room microcode constitutes compelling evidence that the similari-
ties between the NEC microcode and the Intel microcode resulted
from constraints."'  The similarities are greater in the shorter mic-
rosequences (where the constraints would have a greater effect since
there is less opportunity to express the sequence differently) than in
the longer ones. Indeed, this fact was admitted by Inters expert,
Dr. Patterson, during discovery, "Those notes repeatedly corrobo-
rate NEC's position, stating at various points that the expert would
have to examine the longer routines in order to find any meaningful
evidence of copying, because the shorter routines, being so highly
constrained, must inevitably be similar."'47 In fact, one sequence,
the "ESCAPE" sequence of both the NEC and Clean Room ver-
sions was identical, evidencing its constrained nature. Thus, the
court concluded that the expression of the ideas underlying the
shorter microroutines, if protected at all, were protected only
against virtually identical copying. Thus, NEC properly used the
underlying ideas, without virtually identically copying their limited
expression.
Improvements
The alternative argument asserted by NEC that the V20 and
V30 microprocessors are "improvements" upon the lPD 8086 and
[IPD 8088, and were therefore covered by the license agreement,
was rendered moot by the decision. However, the court did give it
brief consideration in the interest of completeness. The "complete-
ness" mentioned by the court also provides a secondary basis for its
decision. Should Intel decide to appeal, Judge Gray's opinion pro-
vides a reviewing court with alternative justifications for its holding.
The determination of whether a writing or physical creation is
no more than an improvement over its predecessors is usually a dif-
ficult task. However, in the words of the court, "the task becomes
much easier if the intent of the parties, particularly the licensee, can
be ascertained."48 In this case, based on the actions of the parties
and the testimony of NEC's principal officers and negotiators, it
was clear that NEC did not regard its microprocessors as mere im-
provements covered under the licensing agreement. Certainly,
45. OPINION at 37.
46. OPINION at 35.
47. HiNCKLEY supra note 36, at 54 n.131.
48. OPINION at 38.
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NEC did not pay any royalties under the license based upon its
sales of the V20 and V30 microprocessors. Thus, the court con-
cluded that this argument was less than persuasive.
CONCLUSION
The copyrightability of microcode now appears to be well es-
tablished. As a computer program (literary work), an author of a
microprogram who makes the requisite showing of an original work
of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression in words,
numbers, or other numerical symbols or indicia may obtain the ben-
efits of copyright protection. The Register of Copyrights is in no
position, given the practical constraints of the process, to make any
determination of copyrightability beyond this initial showing.
However, once granted protection, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
both to vigilantly follow up on its duty to protect the copyright and
to monitor any licensing agreements.
It is also the plaintiff's burden to show that the defendant has
in fact infringed on copy protected material. It is this burden which
is most affected by Judge Gray's decision. The test of substantial
similarity between microcodes must go beyond the constraints act-
ing on the sequences, as well as the limited number of ways in
which to express those sequences independently of those con-
straints. Copyrightable expression in microcode exists only to the
degree that programming choices exist apart from the algorithmics
used. While some programming choices are available to the
microcode designer, for the most part the range of choices and ex-
pressions is so limited that the copyrighted microcode can only pro-
tect against "virtually identical copying." Moreover, even virtually
identical copying of portions of a microcode should not be prohib-
ited when such portions are essential to the function of the macroin-
struction implementation. The court here seeks to strike a balance
between the need for protection of an author's work and the pub-
lic's need for free access to ideas. The dividing line between these
two competing interests is infinitely thin. Although the court here
foregoes any attempt to define this infinity, it has reaffirmed that
diligence and reasonable effort remain essential ingredients for con-
tinued protection.
Scott M. Marconda*
* The author wishes to express his thanks to the law firm of Reynolds, Roux & Price
of Ls Altos, California for its assistance in the production of this casenote. Special thanks as
well to Professor Kenneth Manaster for his advice.
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AN ERRONEOUS DECISION OR A GROUND-BREAKING
CASE? Pearl Systems v. Competition Electronics, Inc., No. 87-
6728 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
On July 15, 1988, a federal judge in the United States District
Court, Southern District of Florida, handed down a curious1
software copyright decision which may potentially have broad im-
plications on software protection under existing software copyright
laws2.
The case is Pearl Systems, Inc. vs. Competition Electronics,
Inc.3 At issue was whether software copyright infringement could
be established by finding that (i) the product incorporating the
software was available to the defendant; and (ii) substantial similar-
ity in the "systems level design" of the software.
The facts in the case are straightforward. Both Pearl Systems
and Competition Electronics (Competition) were manufacturers of
"shot timing" devices used in the competitive sport of pistol shoot-
ing.4 A shot timing device is typically worn on a competitor's belt
and its various functions are activated by a set of switches or but-
tons.5 Both parties' products are controlled by microprocessors.6
Each function in either of these devices is performed by executing a
subroutine written for the internal microprocessor. Of these two
companies, Competition had been in the business longer; by Sep-
tember 1986, Competition had produced successive products Pro
Timer I, Pro Timer II and Pro Timer III, each more sophisticated
than its predecessor.7 Pearl Systems was a relative new-comer in the
shot timer market; its product, PST-10, the accused device in this
case, was introduced in August, 1987.1
1. In one practitioner's words, "[tihe Pearl Systems case is an example of computer
law decisions at their worst." G. Gervaise Davis III, Reaching the Limits of Copyright: Pro-
tecting Programming Languages, Macros, Formats and Computer Hardware under the
Copyright Laws 12 (Nov. 1988) (author's presentation to the Practicing Lawyers Institute
Seminar in New York City).
2. This case was settled while an appeal to the decision was pending before the Elev-
enth Circuit. Hence, the questions raised by the decision in this case will have to be answered
by a similar case in the future.
3. Pearl Systems v. Competition Electronics, Inc. No. 87-6728 (S.D. Fla. July 15,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
4. The court's findings of fact, nos. 1, 2.
5. The court's findings of fact, nos. 4, 5, 6.
6. The court's findings of fact, no. 5.
7. The court's findings of fact, no. 2.
8. The court's findings of fact, no. 1.
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Competition claimed that two copyrighted subroutines, the
"shot review" and "par time entry" subroutines I were copied by
Pearl Systems in the PST-10 from Competition's Pro Timer prod-
ucts. 10 In either product, the "shot review" and the "par time en-
try" functions are activated by pushing a single button.11
In order to prevail, Competition had to establish that it owned
copyrights in the infringed articles and that the defendant copied
them. 2 The ownership issue was not contested.1 3 As is often the
case in infringement actions, direct evidence of copying was un-
available; copying was proved indirectly using a two-prong test, es-
tablishing (i) Pearl Systems' access to the copyrighted work
("access" requirement); and (ii) a substantial similarity between
Competition's copyrighted subroutines and Pearl Systems' subrou-
tines ("substantial similarity" requirement) 4 . Mr. Guido, one of
the two shareholders of Pearl Systems, conceded that he had used
Competition's product. 5 However, the court did not find Pearl
Systems to have access either to the structural design, or to the
source and object codes of Competition's subroutines. The record
also did not show Pearl Systems' access, if any, to Competition's
design work product: flow charts, block diagrams, design or mainte-
nance documents.
Competition presented expert testimony demonstrating that
the "par time entry" and "shot review" functions could be imple-
mented by multiple buttons, or by using switches instead of but-
tons 6. If either of these alternatives had been chosen, the resulting
subroutines would have been vastly different from Competition's
and Pearl Systems' single button approach.7 Both parties
presented experts testifying to the differences and similarities of the
subroutines used in each of the products18 . While the court did not
9. The court's findings of fact, no. 5.
10. The court's findings of fact, no. 3.
11. The court's findings of fact, no. 5.
12. Subsection Two of the court's conclusions of law. The court relied on the following
precedents: Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
13. The court's conclusion of law, no. 2.
14. See discussion in the court's second conclusions of law, relying on: Miller v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981); Ferguson v. National Broad-
casting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop,
533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
15. The court's conclusion of law, no. 3.
16. The court's findings of fact, no. 5.
17. The court's findings of fact, no. 6.
18. The court's findings of fact, nos. 7, 9.
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find substantial similarities at the structural or source code levels,
nonetheless, the court found that the systems level design of these
products was "substantially similar."' 9 Based on the fact that Mr.
Guido understood how Competition's products operate, and had
previously owned Competition's products, the court concluded that
the access requirement was met. Because Pearl Systems was not
constrained by product function (i.e., they could have implemented
the same functions by other than Competition's single button ap-
proach), the court concluded that the substantial similarities in the
products' systems level design could not have been the result of
Pearl Systems' independent creative effort.2'
The Pearl Systems court's application of the infringement two-
prong test was surprising. As to the access requirement, the court
did not find proof of access to the copyrighted material (i.e. the
structural design, the source or object codes of the copyrighted sub-
routines), but was satisfied with the mere showing that Pearl Sys-
tems had purchased a copy of Competition's product. Furthermore,
the court's finding of infringement based on similarities in the sys-
tems level design also extended beyond the software copyright pro-
tection accorded since Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory.2'
By concluding that access to the product satisfied the first
prong of the infringement test, the court implicitly assumed that
access to the copyrighted software necessarily followed product ac-
cess. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on how it came to
such a conclusion. In fact, the court may have underestimated the
difficulty of extracting the software this way. 2 Moreover, while
Pearl Systems could have, in theory, obtained access to the source
or object codes through disassembling the binary image of the pro-
gram stored in the EPROM 23 of Competition's product and then
copied it wholesale, the court's findings of fact indicated that there
19. The court's conclusion of law, no. 3.
20. The court's findings of fact, no. 11.
21. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1986).
22. The programs in a microprocessor-controlled system are typically stored in binary
format inside a non-volatile memory element. See, eg., infra note 24. To obtain the source
code from this binary format, a software tool, called the disassembler, must be used. Even
then, the subroutines desired must be painstakingly singled out from among numerous other
subroutines present, since assembler code -as source code at this level is usually called - is
difficult to read. It is hard to imagine why the sophisticated defendants in this case would
choose to copy Competition's subroutines, when it appears to be much easier to develop the
code themselves, and they had apparently done so to implement the other functions of their
product.
23. Erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), a popular device to store
binary image of programs in a microprocessor-based systems.
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was no such copying. 4 Without direct access to the structural de-
sign of these subroutines, the only remaining possibility is that the
designers at Pearl Systems "reverse engineered" Competition's
product, determined how it works, and then duplicated its function-
ality by writing code that accomplished the same function. Such
conduct, however, was not intended to be prohibited under the 1976
Copyright Act, as illustrated by Congress' Report accompanying
the Act:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer pro-
grams should extend protection to the methodology or processes
adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the "writing"
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b)... is intended, among other
things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the
programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer pro-
gram, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the
program are not within the scope of the copyright law."5
In this regard, the Pearl Systems court's conclusion as to the
access prong of the infringement test was without sufficient factual
basis. Furthermore, if access to the product is sufficient, then the
access prong is essentially waived for any copyrighted software in-
corporated into any product available for sale in the public
marketplace.
The true concern in this case, however, is the court's finding of
infringement of the subroutines based on a substantial similarity in
the systems level design. For argument's sake, ignore the court's
obvious error of identification - that it was the subroutines, rather
than the systems level design, that were copyrighted. The court de-
fined systems level design as "defining the types of functions for the
software to perform and how it will perform these functions."
26
This language amounts to extending copyrights to the methods, or
the actual processes, embodied in the software, in direct contraven-
tion to section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act." Such protection
24. The court concluded, in its finding of facts no. 5, "even though the languages in
which the directions were written (source code) may have differed, they carried the same
message" indicating that Pearl Systems' source code (hence, object code) for the offending
subroutines are different from Competition's.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1976).
See also Note, supra note 2, at 13-14.
26. See supra note 1.
27. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West Supp. 1976). § 102 reads, in total: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id.
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is the domain of patents2", and is subject to requirements of useful-
ness, novelty, and non-obviousness.2 9 Furthermore, such protection
has been denied in copyrights since the seminal case Baker v. Sel-
den. In Baker's often quoted language, "[to] give the [copyright
owner] an exclusive property in the art therein, when no examina-
tion of its novelty has been officially made, would be a surprise and
a fraud upon the public."3 0
The purpose of copyright law is to create the efficient balance
between protection (incentive to authors) and public dissemination
of information (to promote learning, culture and development).31
To carry out this purpose, the tension between the public's free ac-
cess to ideas and the author's proprietary copyright protection must
be resolved.32 The law draws this line by distinguishing between an
idea, and the expression of an idea.33 Whelan provides a test for
making such a distinction:
The purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose
or function would be part of the expression of the idea ... Where
there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then
the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose;
hence there is expression, not idea.3 4
It is this author's opinion that the Whelan test is elegant in
theory, but problematic in practice, and this case illustrates its diffi-
culty. The fact that the Pearl Systems device used the same buttons
to perform the same functions as the competitor's device could have
been interpreted as evidence that both companies found that ap-
proach to be most cost effective to achieve those functions, rather
than evidence indicative that one necessarily copied the other. If we
adopt the former interpretation, then the choice of a single button is
certainly a "purpose of an utilitarian work" (to reduce cost), rather
than a particular expression of an idea; as such, it is not subject to
28. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 100(b), 101 (West Supp. 1988).
29. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 100-103 (West Supp. 1988).
30. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 102 (1879).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. This clause gives Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings."
32. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983). "The line must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in consideration 'the preservation
of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright
laws.'" Id. at 1253.
33. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
34. Whelan v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d at 1236.
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copyright protection35 . Copyright laws should not prohibit a manu-
facturer from manufacturing their products at the lowest cost, just
to avoid the product from being found substantially similar to an-
other manufacturer's systems level design. The factual determina-
tion of "necessary to the purpose," hence, requires a value judgment
of all purposes relevant to the design. Suffice it to say, it is difficult
to enumerate all relevant purposes of any given product, and one
can often find another relevant purpose to justify a particular fea-
ture as necessary. The Pearl Systems court essentially gave up on
this pursuit, and was satisfied with a mere showing that other means
to achieve the same function existed, without considering the eco-
nomic cost, the awkwardness of alternative implementation, or any
other proposition which could legitimately be argued as part of a
"purpose." This is clearly unacceptable and contrary to the intent
of the copyright laws, as discussed above.3 6
In conclusion, the Pearl Systems decision, if followed, will
weaken the "access prong" requirement in a plaintiff's infringement
case, and provide unduly broad protection for computer software.
Such protection would amount to incursion into the domain of pat-
ent protection. The Pearl Systems case also illustrates the weakness
inherent in the Whelan test. The Pearl Systems decision makes bad
public policy and should not be followed.
Edward Chungfan Kwok
35. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) ("Apple seeks here not to protect ideas (i.e., making the machine perform particu-
lar functions) but rather to protect their particular expressions.. ."), affid, 725 F.2d. 521 (9th
Cir. 1984).
36. See supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text.
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